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Government Investment in Banks:  Creeping 
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid? 
Lissa L. Broome 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, twenty-five banks failed, more than in any year since 1993.1  
The pace of bank failure has accelerated in 2009, with the 2008 total of 
twenty-five matched by mid-April.2    Three of the four largest U.S. banking 
institutions were so at risk that one—Wachovia —was acquired by Wells 
Fargo, a smaller institution,3 and two—Citigroup and Bank of America—
were forced to request governmental investments in excess of the initial 
government investments they received under the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP).4  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
ratio of reserves-to-insured deposits slipped to just 0.4% as of year-end 
2008, well below the statutory minimum of 1.15% and the lowest level 
since 1993.5  The aggressive responses to the crisis by Congress, the Trea-
sury Department, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB), and the 
FDIC to help banks improve their capital positions and liquidity have dra-
                                                                                                                           
  Wachovia Professor of Banking Law; Director, Center for Banking and Finance, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law.  Thanks to Eamonn K. Moran, Research Associate, Center 
for Banking and Finance for valuable research assistance, and to Lawrence Baxter, Adam Feibelman, 
Eamonn Moran, and Saule Omarova for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
 1 Joe Adler, Two More Failures Brings 2008 Tally to 25, AM. BANKER, Dec. 15, 2008, at 16; see 
also FDIC, BANK FAILURES & ASSISTANCE, (2008) 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2008/index.html.  Moreover, one of those failed banks – 
Washington Mutual (WaMu) – was the largest bank failure in history.  The WaMu failure was resolved 
at no cost to the FDIC, however, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. purchased its banking operations for $1.9 
billion.  Joe Adler, Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1. 
 2 See http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
 3 As of June 30, 2008, Wachovia’s assets stood at $812.4 billion, thirty-three percent larger than 
Wells Fargo’s $609 billion in assets.   See Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets on 
June 30, 2008, AM. BANKER, Jan.15, 2009. 
 4 Citigroup and Bank of America each received additional TARP funds beyond that in the initial 
Capital Purchase Program.  The government’s investment in preferred stock in each institution now 
stands at $45 billion.  See infra text accompanying notes 26 and 29. 
 5 Joe Adler, FDIC’s New Assessment Lambasted as Unfair, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 2009, at 1. 
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matically altered the liability/equity sides of bank balance sheets.6     This 
unprecedented government assistance to prevent widespread bank failure 
and to provide support for those institutions “too big to fail” underscores 
the vital role that banks play in our economy.   
This Article explores government investment in banks and discusses 
some of the implications of these investments.  In Part II., the government 
investment in bank stocks during the current financial crisis are detailed.  
Part III. recounts the government’s prior extensive investment in preferred 
stock of banks during the Great Depression through the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC), and the government’s equity investment in one 
large bank, Continental Illinois National Bank, to prevent its failure in 
1984.  The implications of government investments in banks are explored in 
Part IV., first through the lens of history with reference to the RFC and 
Continental Illinois, and then considering the current objections and con-
cerns raised about creeping government nationalization of banks.  Finally, 
the article poses the questions yet to be answered about current government 
investments before we learn whether the government will be able to return 
the ownership of financial institutions fully to private hands and without 
significant cost to the public treasury as it was able to do in the prior two 
cases of government ownership examined in this article. 
II.  GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTS IN BANKS DURING THE CURRENT 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Congress’ initial legislative response to the financial crisis was the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), enacted on Octo-
ber 3, 2008.  The $700 billion in funds authorized by Congress in EESA to 
assist in the financial crisis clean-up, labeled “Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram” (TARP), were quickly diverted by then-Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson from buying troubled mortgage-related assets held by banks to 
purchasing preferred, non-voting stock in banks under what is now called 
the Capital Purchase Program (CPP).7  The initial tranche of TARP funds 
was $350 billion, with $250 billion specifically set aside for bank stock 
purchases.  A second bank investment program, the Targeted Investment 
Program (TIP), was announced on November 23, 2008, and has been used 
to fund additional preferred stock investments in Citigroup and Bank of 
America beyond the initial CPP investments.  The Senate authorized the 
second tranche of TARP funds on January 15, 2009, prior to the change in 
                                                                                                                           
 6 These changes are described in Lissa L. Broome, Perspectives on the Financial Crisis:  Ex-
traordinary Government Intervention to Bolster Bank Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST.  (forth-
coming 2009). 
 7 See Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept., Pub. No. HP-1207, Treasury Announces TARP Capital 
Purchase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm [herei-
nafter TARP Capital Purchase Program Description].  
2009] Government Investment in Banks 411 
administration8 pursuant to a request from President Bush made at the urg-
ing of President-elect Obama.9 The new Obama administration announced 
on February 10, 2009, the Financial Stability Plan – its new name for TARP 
– that would fund additional bank stock purchases under a new program 
called the Capital Assistance Program (CAP). 
A.  Capital Purchase Program (CPP) —TARP 110 
The first tranche of funds released by Congress for the TARP 
amounted to $250 billion, and all of it has been committed for CPP and TIP 
preferred stock purchases; as of March 31, 2009, $235.8 billion had actually 
been disbursed.11  Secretary Paulson deemed the CPP a more expeditious 
way to inject capital into the banking system than attempting to value and 
purchase troubled mortgage-related assets held by banks.  Originally, Paul-
son strongly resisted government stock purchases, asserting that taking pre-
ferred stock in banks is “what you do when you have failure” and stating 
“[t]his is about success.”12  His opposition to government stock purchases 
was in stark contrast with the lead of other countries, including the United 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Cheyenne Hopkins, House Passes Symbolic Tarp Block, AM. BANKER, Jan. 23, 2009, at 3 (the 
House voted to block the release of the second tranche of TARP funds, but the move was only symbolic 
since both chambers were required to block the funds and the Senate had approved the second tranche 
on January 15). 
 9 David M. Herszenhorn, At Obama’s Urging, Bush to Seek Rest of Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 12, 2009. 
 10 This section is substantially drawn from Broome, supra note 6. 
 11 FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT BOARD, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 104(G) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 (for the quarter ending 
Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.financial stability.gov/latest/+g_042409.html; see also Mike Ferullo, Trea-
sury Financing:  Treasury Disclosed $15 Billion in Funds to Banks Under Capital Purchase Program, 
92 BNA BANKING REP. 131 (Jan. 20, 2009).  The amount of preferred stock that the government pur-
chased in any one institution could not be less than one percent of the institution’s risk-weighted assets, 
and not more than the lesser of $25 billion or three percent of risk-weighted assets. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM (2009), 
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/program-descriptions/cpp.shtml [hereinafter “Program Descrip-
tion”].  JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America (following the consummation of 
its merger with Merrill Lynch) each received the maximum investment of $25 billion.  U.S. TREAS. 
DEPT., APPENDIX 1, FOURTH TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2009), 
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/Fourth-Tranche-Report-Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Fourth 
Tranche Appendix].  
Such widespread government ownership of bank stock is not without precedent. The Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, established in 1932, bought stock in 6,000 banks at a cost of $1.3 billion, which 
would be approximately $200 billion in today’s dollars, and the government about broke even on the 
subsequent sale of bank stock to investors or back to the banks.  More recently, in 1984, the United 
States took an eighty percent ownership stake in Continental Illinois National Bank, at the time the 
country’s seventh largest bank. See Steve Lohr, Intervention is Bold, but Has a Basis in History, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1. 
 12 Edmund L. Andrews & Mark Landler, White House Overhauling Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 12, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/business/12imf.html (quoting 
testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and, Urban Affairs on Sep-
tember 23, 2008). 
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Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.  But, he soon did an about 
face, announcing the CPP on October 14, 2008.13   
The Treasury Secretary’s authority under EESA to use the so-called 
“bailout” funds to buy preferred stock is somewhat convoluted.  The Secre-
tary is authorized by EESA to “purchase, and to make and fund commit-
ments to purchase, troubled assets from any financial institution.”14  
“Troubled assets” are defined to include the types of assets that most ob-
servers anticipated would be purchased – “residential or commercial mort-
gages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments, that are based on 
or related to such mortgages,”15 as well as “any other financial instrument 
that the [Treasury] Secretary, after consultation with the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines the pur-
chase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability.”16   
The term “financial instrument” is not, however, defined in the statute.  
A colloquy on the floor of the House of Representatives prior to the House 
vote in favor of EESA addressed the scope of the term.  Representative 
Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, con-
firmed that the scope of the assets that the government may purchase “is 
intended to include capital instruments of an institution such as common 
and preferred stock, subordinated and senior debt, and equity rights.”17  
Frank noted that the “authority to buy equity” was added to the EESA by 
the House and the Senate, and that the purpose of the expenditures “is not 
simply buying up the assets, it is to buy equity, and to buy equity in a way 
that the Federal Government will be able to benefit if there is an apprecia-
tion,”18 and “to enable financial institutions to begin providing credit 
again.”19  Representative Jim Moran added that, if done effectively, equity 
infusions have the capacity to provide between ten and twelve times the 
amount of the initial government investment.20 
As the CPP program was originally conceived, there were no specific 
requirements regarding how banks that received the government equity 
infusion should use it.  The expectation by Treasury officials and perhaps 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept., Pub. No. HP-1206, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal 
Reserve and FDIC (Oct. 14, 2008) http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1206.htm; see also Broome, 
supra note 6. 
 14 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. § 101(a)(1) (2008).  
“Financial institution” is defined as “any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank, savings 
association, credit union, security broker or dealer or insurance company . . . having significant opera-
tions in the United States, but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign govern-
ment.”  Id. § 3(5). 
 15 Id. § 3(9)(A). 
 16 Id. § 3(9)(B) (emphasis added). 
 17 154 CONG. REC. H10763 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep. Frank) (emphasis added). 
 18 Id.  
 19 Id. 
 20 154 CONG. REC. H10796 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2008) (statement of Rep. Moran). 
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Congress seems to have been that banks would use the additional capital to 
increase lending, when in fact much of it appears to have been used to shore 
up capital positions and, at least in one case, finance an acquisition of an 
institution that did not have its request for TARP funds honored.21  The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), in its January 2009 report to 
Congress on the efforts of Treasury to address transparency and accounta-
bility issues, noted that Treasury had developed a monthly survey for the 
twenty largest CPP recipients that would provide data on new loan origina-
tions by categories, and data on the purchase of mortgage- and asset-backed 
securities.22  For all other institutions, the Treasury announced that it is 
working with the bank regulators to develop an approach to the analysis of 
the quarterly call report data for CPP institutions to determine lending activ-
ities at CPP institutions compared to lending activity at those institutions 
that did not accept CPP funds.23  
The statute did require that certain executive compensation arrange-
ments for CPP recipients would be limited.24  In addition, banks receiving 
the investment money were required to sign a contract providing that the 
Treasury “may unilaterally amend any provision . . . to the extent required 
to comply with any changes after the Signing Date in applicable federal 
statutes.”25  Some banks cited this open-ended commitment as the reason 
they elected not to apply for TARP money, have yet to decide whether to 
accept it, or have decided not to accept the funds.26   
Institutions accepting preferred stock investments by the United States 
also are required to pay quarterly dividends to the United States of five per-
cent per year for the first five years of the investment and nine percent per 
year thereafter.27  The institution may repurchase the preferred stock three 
years after its issuance for the purchase price plus accrued and unpaid divi-
dends.28  A repurchase is not permitted unless the investment is replaced by 
an equivalent amount of private capital.  The government also receives war-
rants to buy common stock at a market price equal to fifteen percent of its 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See Joe Adler, Success with Failures, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 2008, at 1 (discussing PNC’s 
purchase of National City after Treasury declined to provide TARP funds to National City as a stand-
alone entity). 
 22 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO-09-296, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM:  
STATUS OF EFFORTS TO ADDRESS TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (2009). 
 23 Id. 
 24 See U.S. TREAS. DEPT., EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT, EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION, http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/executivecompensation.shtml (last visited Feb. 8, 
2009).  
 25 U.S. TREAS. DEPT., SECURITIES PURCHASE AGREEMENT, STANDARD TERMS 35 (2008),  
http://www.treas.gov/pres/releases/reports/spa.pdf.  
 26 See Katie Kuehner-Hebert, Approved for Infusions – But Hesitant, AM. BANKER, Jan. 8, 2009, 
at 1. 
 27 See TARP Capital Purchase Program Description, supra note 7. 
 28 Id. 
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preferred stock investment.29  The exercise price for the warrants is the 
common stock price on the date of the investment.30 
B.  Targeted Investment Program for Systemically Significant Institutions31 
On November 23, 2008, the Treasury Department, FRB, and FDIC an-
nounced further actions to support Citigroup.32  This new effort included an 
additional $20 billion investment in Citigroup preferred stock carrying an 
eight percent dividend, as opposed to the five percent dividend due to the 
Treasury during the first five years on its initial $25 billion equity infu-
sion.33  Pursuant to this second extraordinary infusion of equity, the Trea-
sury imposed some additional conditions.  First, dividends on common 
stock are limited to one cent per share per quarter for three years unless the 
Treasury consents to additional dividend payments.34  Second, there are 
additional restrictions on executive compensation,35 and, third, Citigroup 
must adopt the FDIC’s mortgage modification procedures developed in the 
conservatorship of IndyMac.  Bank of America received a similar package 
of benefits, in large part because of its acquisition of loss-plagued Merrill 
Lynch, including another $20 billion preferred stock investment, on January 
16, 2009.36  These additional equity investments in Citigroup and Bank of 
America were pursuant to a new TARP program labeled the Targeted In-
vestment Program (TIP).37  The purpose of TIP is to “foster market stability 
and thereby to strengthen the economy and protect American jobs, savings, 
and retirement security.”38 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. (the market price at investment is to be calculated on a 20-trading day trailing average). 
 31 See, e.g., Broome, supra note 6. 
 32 Press Release, FDIC, Pub. No. PR-125-2008, Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, 
and FDIC on Citigroup (Nov. 23, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/208/pr08125.html. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See text accompanying notes. 
 36 Press Release, FDIC, Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC Provide Assistance to Bank of 
America (Jan. 16, 2009), http://fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09004.html. 
 37 There are currently two other TARP programs in addition to the CPP and TIP.  One, for Sys-
temically Significant Failing Institutions, was used to provide $40 billion to AIG in exchange for pre-
ferred stock and warrants.  See Fourth Tranche Appendix, supra note 11.  The second, announced in 
December 2009, is the Automotive Industry Financing Program in which $19.4 billion (and an addition-
al $4 billion subject to certain conditions) has been committed to GMAC, GM, and Chrysler.  Id. 
 38 Press Release, U.S. Treas. Dept,, Treasury Releases Guidelines for Targeted Investment Pro-
gram (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1338.htm (listing five eligibility considera-
tions that Treasury may consider in providing additional capital under this program). 
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C.  The Financial Stability Plan—TARP 2—and the Capital Assistance   
Program (CAP) 
The Obama Administration’s Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner an-
nounced on February 10, 2009, the outline of the administration’s plans for 
the use of the second tranche of TARP funds authorized in the EESA, or 
Tarp 2.39  The TARP appellation, and any negative connotations it carried, 
were dropped by Secretary Geithner in favor of the “Financial Stability 
Plan.”40  Among other proposals,41 the new plan calls for a “stress test” of 
the nineteen financial institutions whose assets exceed $100 billion, with 
commitments of additional capital to those of the large institutions identi-
fied as needing additional capital under the stress test scenarios.  These in-
stitutions account for approximately two-thirds of all bank holding compa-
ny assets.42   
The stress test is sometimes referred to as the “Forward-Looking Capi-
tal Assessment,”43 and the “Supervisory Capital Assessment Program.”44  
The capital assessment requires bank holding companies to predict their 
losses over the next two years under two different economic scenarios:  a 
“baseline” scenario that is supposed to mirror the consensus view about the 
length and severity of the recession45  and a “more adverse” scenario assum-
ing a longer and more severe recession.46  Some observers worry, however, 
that  the more adverse scenario “may not be dire enough” since it assumes:  
only a 3.3% contraction in the economy in 2009 with no additional contrac-
tion in 2010; that unemployment will hit 8.9% in 2009 and 10.3% in 2010; 
and that housing prices will lose 22% in 2009.
 47  Moreover, each covered 
financial institution carries out its own analysis under government supervi-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Secretary Geithner Introduces Financial Stability Plan, Feb. 10, 2009, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/tg18.htm. 
 40 Id.  (“[W]e will replace the current program with a new Financial Stability Plan to stabilize and 
repair the financial system, and support the flow of credit necessary for recovery . . . .”). 
 41 The other pillars of the Financial Stability Plan include a Public-Private Investment Fund which 
“provide[s] government capital and government financing to help leverage private capital” and to get 
markets working again by purchasing loans and assets that are burdening the balance sheets of financial 
institutions; a commitment of up to $1 trillion to support a Consumer and Business Lending Initiative 
built on the Federal Reserve’s Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility to restart the securitization 
markets for small business lending, consumer and auto loans, student loans, and commercial mortgages; 
and the establishment of a housing program to bring down mortgage payments and reduce mortgage 
interest. 
 42 FAQs – Supervisory Capital Assessment Program Q2 [hereinafter “Capital Assessment 
FAQs”], available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2009/pr09025a.pdf. 
 43 White Paper, infra note 51, at 2. 
 44 Capital Assessment FAQs, supra note 42.  
 45 Capital Assessment FAQs, App., supra note 42.  
 46 Id.  
 47 Editorial, Stress-Testing the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/02/opinion/02mon1.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=stress%20testing%20the
%20banks&st=cse. 
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sion.48 Concerned observers worry that banks’ incentives to minimize the 
capital they need may skew test results.49The stress tests were completed by 
the end of April 2009 with banks afforded the opportunity to challenge the 
results before they are made public in early May 2009.Federal banking reg-
ulators, following discussions with the nineteen financial institutions, will 
determine whether each institution’s capital is sufficient given the results of 
the stress tests.50     
The new vehicle for equity investments in bank stock in the Financial 
Stability Plan  is the Capital Assistance Program (CAP).51  If the stress indi-
cates a need for additional capital, the bank may try to raise private capital 
to fill the gap.  If private capital cannot be raised in six months, then the 
bank may get the capital from the government’s lcommitment to issue a 
new CAP convertible preferred security to the Treasury in the amount re-
quired. 52   
The Joint Press release of the federal banking regulators of February 
23, 2009, notes two purposes for CAP:  “to preserve the viability of system-
ically important financial institutions so that they are able to meet their 
commitments,” and to “ensure that banks have the capital and liquidity they 
need to provide the credit necessary to restore economic growth.”53  Bank-
ing institutions other than the largest nineteen that have been subjected to 
the stress testing may also access CAP “to increase capital buffers as neces-
sary.”54  Moreover, any banking organization that is a participant in the CPP 
may, with supervisory approval, exchange the TARP preferred stock for the 
CAP security.55   
The CAP security is a preferred security that may be converted into 
common equity – contingent common capital – if conversion is needed to 
maintain investor confidence or to meet the expectations of regulators about 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Capital Assessment FAQs, Q3 & Q6, supra note 42.  
 51 U.S. Treasury, The Capital Assistance Program and its role in the Financial Stability Plan, Feb. 
25, 2009 [hereinafter “White Paper”], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf; U.S. Treasury, Summary of 
Mandatorily Convertible Preferrred Stock (“Convertible Preferred”) Terms, Feb. 25, 2009 [hereinafter 
“CAP Term Sheet”], available at  http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_captermsheet.pdf; 
U.S. Treasury, Capital Assistance Program FAQs, Feb. 25, 2009 [hereinafter “CAP FAQs”], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_cap_faq.pdf. 
 52 Capital Assessment FAQs, Q10, supra note 42.  
 53 Joint Statement by the Treasury, FDIC, OCC, OTS, and the Federal Reserve, Feb. 23, 2009, 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20090223a.htm. 
 54 White Paper, supra  note 40, at 3 & n.2.  See also Bonnie McGeer & Marissa Fajt, Healthy 
Firms Worry Treasury Capital Now Tainted, AM. BANKER, Mar. 2, 2009 (discussing concern among 
bankers that the capital program “was billed last fall as a way to spur healthy banks to lend more [and] is 
now seen as assistance for weak banks”). 
 55 White Paper, supra note 51, at 3. 
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the amount and composition of capital.56    The preferred stock automatical-
ly converts to common stock after seven years.57  The dividend rate on the 
convertible preferred is nine percent per annum, in excess of the five per-
cent rate for the first three years for the CPP preferred stock and the eight 
percent rate on the TIP preferred positions in Citigroup and Bank of Ameri-
ca.58  While the convertible preferred stock is outstanding, dividends on the 
institution’s common stock are limited to one cent per share per quarter 
unless the Treasury consents to a higher amount.59   After conversion to 
common stock, the Treasury will have the voting rights in the stock.60  The 
Treasury has indicated that it will publish “principles governing its use of 
these rights” prior to the conversion to common stock.61 
The incentive for a financial institution to convert from CPP preferred 
stock to the CAP preferred convertible stock, notwithstanding the higher 
dividend cost (nine percent instead of five percent), appears to be a poten-
tial increase in investor confidence because the preferred stock could be 
converted into common stock should the institution need additional, tangi-
ble common equity.   Moreover, while the preferred convertible CAP stock 
is outstanding, the institution’s common stock dividend costs will be li-
mited.  A significant dividend reduction will increase retained earnings and 
capital,62 but could that could also be accomplished by the institution at its 
own volition and without government mandate.  
The new emphasis on tangible common equity (TCE) is also apparent 
in the Treasury’s announcement on February 27, 2009, that, at Citigroup’s 
request, it would convert up to its initial $25 billion in CPP preferred stock 
to common stock on a dollar-for-dollar basis with other private preferred 
stockholders.63  The advantages to Citigroup of this conversion are that it 
will no longer need to pay a five percent dividend to the Treasury for the 
preferred stock.  In addition, Citigroup’s TCE will increase by the amount 
of the preferred stock converted.  Some market participants view tangible 
common equity as a better measure of an institution’s health than its Tier 1 
Capital or Total Capital ratios.64  TCE is a ratio based on an institution’s 
common stock to its total assets.  The Tier 1 Capital raio is based on an 
                                                                                                                           
 56 White Paper, supra  note 51, at 3. 
 57 CAP Term Sheet, supra  note 51, at 3. 
 58 CAP Term Sheet, supra  note 51, at 4.   
 59 CAP Term Sheet, supra  note 51, at 4-5. 
 60 Id. at 5. 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Warren Buffett on Wells Fargo (Interview by Adam Lashinsky), Apr. 20, 2009, 
http://cnnmoney.com (Noting that Wells Fargo has voluntarily cut its dividend rate by 85% and “will be 
piling up equity while they’re paying nominal dividends.”). 
 63 Department of Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Announces Participation in Citigroup’s Ex-
change Offering, Feb. 27, 2009 (hereafter “Citi Exchange Offering Press Release”), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg41.htm.   
 64 Cheyenne Hopkins, Citi Converts Tarp Funds to Common Stock, AM. BANKER, Feb. 27, 2009.   
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institution’s core capital divided by its risk-adjusted assets.  By adjusting 
assets based on their risk, it is a more finely tuned ration than TCE.  But, 
Tier 1 Capital includes as core capital some items in addition to common 
equity, including noncumulative perpetual preferred stock and minority 
interests in consolidated subsidiaries.65  The Total Capital ratio is also based 
on risk-adjusted assets, but is calculated by adding Tier 2 Capital to the Tier 
1 Capital amount.  Tier 2 capital includes other long-term funding sources 
such as cumulative perpetual preferred stock, long-term preferred stock, 
convertible preferred stock, some subordinated debt instruments, and the 
allowance for loan and lease losses.66  Thus, it appears likely that the CPP 
and CAP preferred stock would be classified as Tier 2 capital for purposes 
of calculating an institution’s Total Capital ratio.  In most cases, one would 
expect the Total Capital ratio to be the highest ratio, followed by the Tier 1 
Capital ratio, and then the TCE.  To the extent the stress test looks to TCE,67 
this conversion of Citicorp’s CAP preferred stock to common equity may 
have been necessary to assure that Citigroup does not fail the stress test.68  
Citigroup announced that in connection with this exchange it was suspend-
ing its dividend payments to its preferred and common shareholders.69   
The conversion of preferred stock to common stock dilutes Citigroup’s 
existing common shareholders, but also removes preferred stockholders and 
their ability to be paid before common shareholders in a liquidation pro-
ceeding.70  This new focus on TCE is curious since the conversion of CAP 
preferred stock to common equity to bolster TCE does not increase the gov-
ernment’s investment in Citigroup or provide any new capital to Citigroup.  
The conversion just rearranges the composition of Citigroup’s capital 
among the various capital elements.  If this increase in common equity 
quells market fears about the adequacy of Citigroup’s capital, the conver-
sion, although dilutive, may ultimately inure to the benefit of the preexist-
ing common shareholders.71   The government may view this more as pro-
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viding a benefit to Citigroup (through a higher TCE) without additional cost 
to the government or appropriation of additional TARP funding.  The injec-
tion of the government as a shareholder of common stock in Citigroup (or 
in institutions that convert CAP preferred convertible stock to common 
stock) raised concerns about government nationalization, which will be 
discussed later in this article.  Indeed, the exchange price appears to have 
been set at a relatively high rate, perhaps to ensure that the government’s 
percentage share of Citigroup’s common stock is not a majority interest.72     
D.  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) and Conditions 
Imposed on TARP Recipients 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), 
signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009 -- the stimulus bill -- 
placed substantial conditions on TARP recipients that will apply to reci-
pients of government investments under the new CAP program as well.73  
EESA originally placed some limits on executive compensation at institu-
tions receiving government assistance.74  The three major features of the 
EESA on executive compensation were to require review of the compensa-
tion arrangements of the top five executives and a certification that their 
compensation packages do not encourage excessive and unnecessary risk-
taking; to limit golden parachute payments to the top five executives to 
three times their base amounts under section 280G of the Internal Revenue 
Code; and to require that any incentive compensation paid to the top five 
executives be subject to a “clawback” in the event the financial statements 
on which the compensation was based were subsequently found to be mate-
rially inaccurate.75  Public outrage over payment of bonuses at Merrill 
Lynch just prior to consummation of its merger with Bank of America, and 
other compensation to executives that seemed excessive in the light of 
losses suffered by their institutions and employee layoffs at their institu-
tions, spurred the Treasury Department to announce additional executive 
compensation restrictions applicable to institutions receiving federal assis-
tance on February 4, 2009.76  Most of these new guidelines were superseded 
by the ARRA, which was enacted less than two weeks later. 
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ARRA amends EESA’s executive compensation restrictions and ap-
plies the new restrictions retroactively to those institutions that have already 
received TARP funds as well as prospectively to recipients of new forms of 
government assistance.77  ARRA prohibits bonuses, retention awards, or 
other incentive compensation, except for restricted stock awards.78  Re-
stricted stock, however, is limited in amount to less than one-third of an 
employee’s annual compensation and may not fully vest until after the 
TARP obligation is repaid.79  The number of an institution’s employees that 
are subject to these limits depends on the amount of government assistance 
received by the institution.80  The highest number of affected employees is 
twenty-five, and that applies to any institution that has received $500 mil-
lion or more in assistance from the government..81  Employees with em-
ployment contracts entered into before February 11, 2009, entitling them to 
incentive compensation, are grandfathered in and may receive that compen-
sation.82  The EESA restrictions on golden parachutes were expanded to 
cover the ten highest paid employees, and the clawback provision was ex-
panded to include the twenty-five highest paid employees.83  Furthermore, 
prior compensation and bonuses of the top twenty-five employees must be 
reviewed by Treasury to determine whether any payments were inconsistent 
with the ARRA standards or otherwise contrary to the public interest.84  If 
so, the Treasury must negotiate with the financial institution and the em-
ployee for reimbursement of the funds to the government.85  Finally, res-
ponding to notable lapses of judgment by financial institutions receiving 
government assistance, ARRA requires that each TARP recipient establish a 
policy on excessive or luxury expenditures.86  The expenditures to be ad-
dressed include events, entertainment, office renovations, and planes or 
other transportation services.87   
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The Treasury Department is to issue regulations implementing these 
new statutory provisions as soon as practicable.88  The regulations will 
hopefully clarify whether the Treasury’s Guidelines on Executive Compen-
sation announced on February 4, 2009, most of which are specifically su-
perseded by ARRA, still apply with respect to the announced $500,000 
limit on compensation (other than restricted stock) to senior executives of 
institutions receiving TARP assistance. 
Institutions unwilling to play by these new, and some would say more 
onerous, rules are permitted to prepay their TARP assistance to the Treasury 
if approved by the Treasury and the institution’s regulator.89  A number of 
institutions have indicated that because of these additional restrictions they 
are seeking government permission to repay their TARP investments.90  
TARP investments may be repaid under this provision, amending EESA, 
even if the funds are not replaced by private capital.91  
E.  Budget Placeholder for Additional TARP Funds 
President Obama’s first budget, unveiled on February 25, 2009, con-
tains a $250 billion placeholder for government losses associated with its 
bank investments.92  The amount assumes that Congress authorizes $750 
billion in additional funds to provide support for financial institutions, but is 
only repaid two-thirds of its investment, leaving a $250 billion cost.93  It is 
possible, of course, that the administration will not need to ask Congress for 
additional funding, but President Obama decided that it was important to 
acknowledge the possibility of this additional cost.94   
III. GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN BANK STOCK DURING PRIOR CRISES 
This section discusses the implications of government investment in 
banks by first reviewing prior government ownership of bank stocks.  Dur-
ing the Great Depression, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) 
purchased stock in forty percent of all banks,95 and in 1984 the government 
became the major shareholder of Continental Illinois National Bank.  After 
analyzing these government investments, this Part will explore some of the 
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implications of the current, extraordinary government investment in banks 
and bank holding companies. 
A.  Reconstruction Finance Corporation (1932 – 1957) 
Congress created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in 
January 1932.  Its original purpose was to make loans to banks, along with 
railroads and state and local governments.  In March 1933, the Emergency 
Banking Act authorized the RFC to purchase preferred stock in banks “in 
need of funds for capital purposes either in connection with the organization 
or reorganization of such [banks].”96  The RFC was directed to invest only 
in “sound” banks, but had broad discretion to determine what constituted a 
sound institution.  The preferred stock carried voting rights and had a 10-
year maturity, but was not convertible to common stock and was not ac-
companied by warrants to purchase stock.97 RFC investments often meant 
new executive officers and directors, and reduction in salaries of senior 
bank officials,98 although RFC officials contended that only once did the 
RFC nominate a specific individual over the objection of the current direc-
tors.99  
The preferred stock purchase program got off to a slow start.  Those 
banks that reopened after the nationwide bank holiday expressed little inter-
est.100  Some banks feared that participation in the program might be inter-
preted as a sign of financial weakness.  Banks also may have been con-
cerned about making the dividend payments required on the preferred 
stock.101  The Roosevelt administration encouraged banks to participate in 
the program so that they would be able to meet the solvency prerequisite for 
federal deposit insurance, then a new program created by Congress in June 
1933, and to commence on January 1, 1934.102  RFC investment increased 
substantially in late 1933 in response to this White House pressure and re-
mained high through the first half of 1934.103  Over the course of the next 
year, RFC investment slowed and healthier banks began retiring their obli-
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gations, reducing the amount of RFC capital outstanding.104The RFC com-
mitted a total of $1.2 billion to the preferred stock purchase program, and in 
June 1935, held $892 million in bank capital.105      New bank investment by 
the RFC effectively ended by the close of 1935.  Notwithstanding the large 
infusion of RFC capital, total bank lending continued to stagnate and was 
just as weak at banks with high RFC capital as at banks with low RFC capi-
tal.106   
Milton Friedman observed that the RFC “played a major role in the 
restoration of the banking system.”107  Jesse Jones, the head of the RFC for 
thirteen years, commented:  “This program of putting capital into banks 
prevented the failure of our whole credit system.”108  He continued: 
If the system as a whole had not been assisted by the injection of a 
large amount of new capital into about one-half of all banks in the 
country, the collapse would have become so widespread that few, if 
any, banks could have continued operating.109 
Moreover, following the preferred stock injections that began in 1933, 
there was a sharp decline in bank failures from an average of 10.7% per 
year from 1930-1933 to 0.4% per year from 1934-1940.110  Banks receiving 
RFC capital, however, failed at a higher rate than banks that did not receive 
RFC capital, perhaps because some nonviable banks received RFC capi-
tal.111  Nevertheless, “while the RFC may have propped up some nonviable 
banks that later failed, it may have rescued an even greater number of via-
ble banks that later recovered.”112 
The United States government essentially broke even on its RFC in-
vestments, ignoring the time value of money.113  After 1935, banks steadily 
repaid their RFC preferred stock investments to the government, and, by the 
end of 1947, only $146 million remained on the banks’ books out of a total 
government investment of $1.2 billion.114  The RFC charged-off only $11 
million from 1933 to 1947.115  Repayments continued until the agency was 
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abolished in 1957 with less than $5 million in two banks remaining unpa-
id.116 
B.  Continental Illinois National Bank (1984 – 1991) 
Government investment in a single bank in 1984, Continental Illinois 
National Bank in Chicago – then the nation’s seventh largest bank and the 
largest commercial and industrial bank117– demonstrates the public dissatis-
faction and political fallout that ensued from government stock ownership.  
Continental faced a run from depositors in part as the result of its $1 billion 
purchase of participations in speculative oil and gas exploration loans from 
PennSquare Bank, N.A. of Oklahoma which subsequently failed.  The gov-
ernment intervened and provided a package of extraordinary interventions 
for Continental, fearful that its failure would result in the failure of a num-
ber of other financial institutions.  Approximately 2,300 correspondent 
banks had funds on deposit at Continental Illinois.118  Over forty-two per-
cent of those banks had deposits in excess of the $100,000 deposit insur-
ance limit.119  The uninsured deposits of correspondent banks amounted to 
almost $6 billion.120  Moreover, sixty-six of the correspondent banks, with 
total assets of almost $5 billion, had amounts equal to over 100% of their 
equity capital on deposit at Continental, while another 113 banks, with total 
assets of over $12 billion held amounts on deposit at Continental equaling 
between fifty and one hundred percent of their equity capital.121 
Among the government interventions was the FDIC’s acquisition of $1 
billion in preferred stock in Continental Illinois Corporation (CIC), which 
the holding company was obligated to transfer to the bank as equity.122  The 
investment in the holding company stock rather than the bank’s stock was 
necessary because outstanding indenture agreements with the holding com-
pany prevented a direct investment in the bank subsidiary.123  The holding 
company investment was controversial because it served to cushion holding 
company bondholders from loss.124 
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The FDIC purchased $720 million of permanent, convertible, nonvot-
ing, junior preferred stock and $280 million of permanent, adjustable rate, 
cumulative preferred stock.125  Pursuant to the terms of the government as-
sistance, the senior management and board of directors of Continental Illi-
nois were replaced.126  The FDIC took seven years to completely divest it-
self of its Continental shares by gradually selling its stake in the market.  
The first sale occurred two years after the implementation of the bailout in 
December 1986.127  Subsequent sales occurred in December 1988 and Au-
gust 1989, with a final sale in June 1991.128  At the time of each sale of the 
convertible stock, it was converted to common stock.129  The FDIC realized 
a net gain of $200 million in excess of its $1 billion investment.130
 
 
The FDIC’s stake in Continental constituted eighty percent ownership, 
and the FDIC’s assistance package was frequently characterized as nationa-
lization of the bank, even though the FDIC shares did not contain voting 
rights.  In any event, the combination of assistance provided to Continental 
– FDIC insurance guarantee to all depositors and creditors, the possibility 
that Continental shareholders might retain some value from their invest-
ment rather than being wiped out by the bank’s insolvency, and the substan-
tial protection of the holding company’s bondholders – resulted in substan-
tial criticism.131  The widely held belief was that the FDIC had determined 
that some institutions were “too big to fail,”132 while others were not, creat-
ing “a significant inequity in the deposit insurance system.”133 
Ultimately, Congress required in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) that the FDIC use the “least cost 
resolution” method in resolving an insolvent bank; although, the FDICIA 
provided a systemic risk exception from that requirement to permit assis-
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tance, including open bank assistance, if the institution’s failure would have 
“serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”134 
IV.  EVALUATING GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN BANKS 
This Part evaluates government investment in banks first through the 
lens of the RFC and the Continental Illinois experience.  Next, implications 
of the current government investment regime are highlighted. 
A.  Through an Historical Lens 
1.  Comparisons with the RFC Preferred Stock Investments 
 
The success of the RFC was cited by Senator Charles Schumer and 
others as Congress was considering passage of the EESA in 2008.135  The 
initial focus of the EESA seemed to be the government purchase of the 
troubled assets (loans) held by banks, but Schumer argued that this would 
not do enough to buttress bank capital and proposed recreating the RFC to 
“provide capital to struggling financial institutions in exchange for an equi-
ty stake.”136 
The RFC preferred stock purchases are similar in many respects to the 
government’s CPP purchase program.  The stock issue was preferred stock.  
The RFC had the discretion to determine which institutions would receive 
the stock and no doubt they included some nonviable banks in that mix.  As 
with the RFC investments, some banks were reluctant to participate in the 
CPP program for fear of showing financial weakness to their customers and 
investors.  Nevertheless, a substantial portion of bank capital was held by 
the government.  Banks that did take the investments had a strong interest 
in retiring the government’s stake as soon as feasible.  The government 
investments did not necessarily spur additional lending, but rather may have 
provided assistance to banks that might have otherwise failed.  Salaries of 
bank employees were under scrutiny and sometimes reduced. 
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There remain some notable differences.  The RFC had voting rights at-
tached to its preferred stock, but did not receive warrants to purchase com-
mon stock or have the right to convert the preferred stock into common 
stock.  The government’s current preferred stock investments do not carry 
voting rights, but upon conversion of the CAP convertible preferred to 
common stock, the Treasury will have voting rights.  Observers of the RFC 
were concerned about the government’s use of its voting powers, but as 
previously explained each institution ultimately paid back its RFC invest-
ment and regained its status as a wholly privately owned entity.  The Brook-
ings Institution published a book in 1934 recounting the contemporary con-
cerns with the government exercising voting power over bank stocks. 
[D]irect ownership of equities and participation in the management of 
individual banks, is a new thing in American banking history.  Gov-
ernment ownership has never been accepted or even made a serious 
political issue.  But almost without realization by the public, the gov-
ernment has established in the RFC the largest bank in the world and 
through it the government now has a substantial voting interest in half 
the commercial banks of the nation. . . .  Inasmuch as it owns half the 
stock of most of the reorganized national banks, [the RFC] is obvious-
ly in a position to exert substantial control over their management.137 
In response to this critique, the Chairman of the RFC repeatedly noted: 
the government has, and has had, only two objective in view in its pre-
ferred stock program.  One to strengthen the banks in the interests of 
depositors, and the other to place banks in such a strong capital posi-
tion as to engable them to assist in the recovery program by providing 
legal credit for agriculture, business, and industry. 
There is no thought of dictating management nor of coercion as to 
bank policies or bank investment.138 
The RFC preferred stock investments may have helped weak banks 
reassure uninsured depositors about the safety of their funds.  The initial 
limit on deposit insurance was $2,500, which meant that only one-third of 
all bank deposits were insured, although this percentage increased to forty-
four percent when the deposit insurance limit was raised to $5,000 in the 
second half of 1934.139  Without the RFC investment, uninsured depositors 
of troubled banks might have demanded higher interest for their deposits or 
withdrawn their funds.140 
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This justification for government capital injections is weaker today, 
when virtually all deposits are at least temporarily covered by deposit in-
surance, allowing all banks to raise deposits at a low (risk-free) rate of in-
terest.  In the EESA, enacted on October 3, 2008, the deposit insurance 
limit was increased from $100,000 to $250,000 until December 31, 2009.141  
Less than two weeks later, the FDIC announced on October 14, 2008, that it 
would provide unlimited deposit insurance to non-interest bearing transac-
tion account holders until December 31, 2009, if a bank elected to seek 
such coverage, under the Temporary Liquidity Guaranty Program 
(TLGP).142  Moreover, the TLGP also provides FDIC guarantees for certain 
bank unsecured debt, meant to allow banks to borrow at risk-free rates from 
non-deposit creditors.   
Given the strong similarities between the RFC and the current pro-
grams for government investment in bank stock, there is hope that Trea-
sury’s investments will be as successful as the RFC’s appeared to have been 
in warding off a failure of the credit market system, decreasing the rate of 
bank failures, and recovering the government’s investment after the banks’ 
return to health.  Moreover, the preferred shareholdings of the government 
do not carry voting rights, although the opportunity for government influ-
ence and control is still undeniable.  Even if CAP convertible preferred 
stock is converted to common stock with voting rights, the experience of 
the RFC might provide some comfort that government voting rights did not 
unnecessarily complicate the management of the banks in which the gov-
ernment invested.   
2.  Comparisons with the Ownership of Continental Illinois 
As noted above, the RFC investments closely mirror the Treasury’s 
CPP program to invest in the preferred stock of financial institutions.  The 
Continental Illinois investment, however, is more similar to the additional 
TIP investments made in Citigroup and Bank of America, and perhaps to 
any additional CAP investments made in the nineteen largest financial insti-
tutions as the result of their performance on the stress tests. As with Conti-
nental Illinois, the government has concluded that additional aid may be 
needed to protect “systemically significant” institutions, or those formerly 
known as “too big to fail.”  The justification for protecting these large insti-
tutions is, in part, the same justification used to protect Continental Illinois 
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1821(a)(1)(E) to increase the standard maximum deposit insurance amount from $100,000 to $250,000).  
 142 Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity, Creates New Program 
to Guarantee Bank Debt and Fully Insure Non-Interest Bearing Deposit Transaction Accounts (Oct. 14, 
2008), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html.  This program was autho-
rized under the systemic risk exception.  
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– the repercussions of a failure of a very large financial institution would be 
far-reaching and harm other smaller financial institutions.   
The government’s ownership stake in Continental Illinois was quite 
significant.  As an owner, it replaced the bank’s senior management and its 
board.  Citigroup has shaken-up its board at the request of the government, 
but so far has not considered replacement of senior management.  The gov-
ernment also extended FDIC insurance protection and guarantees to all oth-
er depositors and creditors of Continental.  In the current crisis, all banks 
are benefiting from temporarily expanded deposit insurance coverage and 
unsecured debt guarantees.  These benefits have not been limited to the 
systemically significant financial institutions.  The concern about the ineq-
uity involved when systemically significant institutions such as Citigroup 
and Bank of America receive extra relief (and the other seventeen institu-
tions exceeding $500 billion in assets may soon receive) when others  are 
allowed to fail continues in today’s crisis.  As recounted in the Introduction, 
bank failures are increasing in number and frequency, but so far have been 
confined to smaller institutions.   
In the current crisis, investments were made in holding companies 
without the explicit requirement that the capital be invested in the bank 
subsidiary.  This led to the rush of financial institutions, such as Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, that previously avoided being characterized as 
bank holding companies subject to Federal Reserve Board regulation and 
oversight, seeking to be designated bank holding companies.  Indeed, there 
is some evidence that government capital investments did not necessarily 
get passed down to the bank subsidiaries where they would be most likely 
to achieve the purpose of stimulating lending and protecting the solvency of 
the bank subsidiary.143  In the case of Continental Illinois, the holding com-
pany was required to transfer its government investment to its bank subsidi-
ary as equity.  The lack of such a requirement in our current crisis is cu-
rious.  Is aid to the holding company by design to keep the holding compa-
ny and its nonbanking subsidiaries from bankruptcy or did the government 
fail to make clear its desire that the aid be directed to the bank subsidiary to 
protect the FDIC from excessive losses from bank failures? 
A ray of hope from the government’s experience as a major sharehold-
er of Continental Illinois was that it was able to orderly liquidate its owner-
                                                                                                                           
 143 See John C. Coates & David S. Scharfstein, The Bailout Is Robbing the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 18, 2009, at A27 (noting that J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells received 
$90 billion in TARP money in the fall of 2008, but that “by the end of 2008 they had contributed less 
than $15 billion in equity capital to their subsidiary banks”).  The authors suggest that holding compa-
nies may be reluctant to contribute equity capital to an insolvent bank subsidiary since if the government 
takes over the insolvent bank, the holding company loses its investment in it.  Id.  The authors suggest 
that if the government continues to make investments in bank holding companies, that it require that the 
investment be directed to subsidiaries – bank and nonbank – that the government explicitly wishes to 
support.  Id. 
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ship interest over time without suffering a loss.  The government’s stakes in 
Citigroup and Bank of America are in the two largest banks in the United 
States.  It is also not clear what additional investments the government may 
make in those two institutions or in other systemically significant institu-
tions.  It is likely that government divestment of its ownership interests of 
these larger institutions and more institutions will take longer and may not 
be on terms as favorable to the government as experienced with Continental 
Illinois.    
B.  Implications of the Current Government Investment in Banks 
The purpose of government investment in banks has evolved over time 
and now seems to include several purposes.  Among these, are to provide 
additional capital to spur increased bank lending, to protect systemically 
significant financial institutions from failure, and to provide assistance to 
other institutions so that they will not become insolvent and place further 
strain on the dwindling FDIC reserves.   
To the extent that increasing lending remains an important purpose of 
the capital investments, it is an objective that faces several obstacles.  The 
first obstacle is the lack of an explicit requirement that the government-
provided preferred stock investment be down-streamed to the bank subsidi-
ary.144  The second obstacle to increased bank lending is that the purchase of 
preferred stock under the CPP program for those financial institutions that 
applied and were approved comes at a cost.  The dividend due to the gov-
ernment is five percent for the first five years, increasing to nine percent 
thereafter.   Preferred stock issued to Citigroup and Bank of America, pur-
suant to the TIP program for systemically significant institutions, carries an 
eight percent dividend; the new CAP convertible preferred stock will earn 
nine percent.  The cost of this source of funds is offset by the lower cost 
funds that a bank may raise through insured deposits and debt that carries 
the FDIC’s guarantee.  Banks must then find lending opportunities that re-
turn more than their total cost of funds,145 but still meet the safety and 
soundness requirements expected by bank examiners.    Thus, the cost of 
the preferred stock purchases may induce risky lending behavior by banks 
rationally seeking a high enough return on loans to offset the bank’s cost of 
funds, including the preferred stock dividend to be paid to the government.  
At the same time, loan portfolios will be scrupulously examined by bank 
regulators to ensure prudent lending practices.  One implication of the ex-
                                                                                                                           
 144 See supra note 151. 
 145 In the first week of January 2009, the average rate on a thirty-year home mortgage loan was 
only 5.01%, declining in the week of January 15 to just 4.96%, and rebounding the week of January 22 
to 5.12%.  See Freddie Mac, Weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey, available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp (last visited February 8, 
2009).  
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traordinary government intervention is that the cost of the preferred stock 
and the caution of bank examiners may result in a standoff in which the 
new equity does not make its way into increased lending, as was originally 
anticipated.  Increased reporting of loan activity for government-assisted 
institutions may provide additional incentives for institutions to seek out 
safe and sound lending opportunities.   
To the extent that the dividend costs associated with CPP and CAP 
stock are viewed as excessive, there is an incentive to seek permission to 
convert the stock to the lower cost common stock.  A second implication of 
government investments in bank stock is that the possibility of conversion 
of the government’s interest to common stock through the CAP convertible 
preferred security or a government mandated conversion of CPP preferred 
stock to common stock may serve to deter private capital investments into 
banks through new stock issuances or depress the price of existing shares 
because of the possibility of dilution.  On the other hand, existing share-
holders may benefit by the addition of more tangible common equity to 
help absorb the bank’s losses.  Private capital may find the common stock 
of the TIP and CAP recipients less attractive, however, because of the TIP 
and CAP limitation of dividends on common stock to one cent per share per 
quarter for three years while those preferred stock investments are outstand-
ing. 
A third implication of the preferred stock purchases is that the gov-
ernment has an increased interest in the success of the institutions in which 
it has invested.  The Treasury will not be paid its dividend or be repaid its 
investment upon a repurchase of the stock by the institution if the institution 
fails.  The government’s financial stake in the institution could conceivably 
influence its decision to continue providing assistance to the institution in 
order to prevent the failure from wiping out its equity interest.  This incen-
tive would presumably be greatest where the government has the most to 
lose – the largest institutions in which its investment is most significant, 
including Citigroup and Bank of America.  A fourth implication is the im-
pact of the government as shareholder on bank management, policies, mer-
gers, and credit decisions.  Although its preferred stock may not carry vot-
ing privileges, as regulator and owner, the government’s influence is likely 
to be substantial and avoiding conflicts and the appearance of conflicts will 
be important.   
The government will also need to be clear as to when and how a finan-
cial institution may buy out the government’s interest.  The initial limitation 
on repurchase of the CPP preferred stock was that three years have passed 
since its issuance and an amount equivalent to the investment is replaced 
with private capital.146  The investment contract signed by each TARP reci-
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pient permits retroactive changes to the contract wto comply with any post-
closing changes in federal statutes.147  The stimulus bill, ARRA, applied its 
executive compensation restrictions retroactively to all TARP recipients.148  
The statute further provides that financial institutions may seek government 
permission to buy the TARP investments back from the government prior to 
the initial three-year holding period and without being replaced by private 
capital.149   
A number of institutions will likely seek to buy out the government’s 
interest.  At least two items, however, are unresolved.  First, what is the 
criteria the government will use in granting peromission to pay it back?  
Will it be the ability of the particular institution to succeed without the gov-
ernment investment, or will it be, as Treasury Secretary Geithner has sug-
gested, whether the entire financial system is capable of providing adequate 
credit to the U.S. economy?150  A second issue is how CPP recipients may 
buy back the warrants to purchase common stock that they issued to the 
government along with its preferred stock.  Although in many cases the 
warrants’ exercise price is below the current stock price, the warrants may 
be exercised over a ten-year period.  Determining the present value of the 
warrants is difficult, and banks complain that requiring them to buy out the 
government warrants amounts to an onerous prepayment penalty.151  Banks 
argue they should be excused from paying for the warrants in the light of 
the increasingly onerous TARP conditions, including those on executive 
compensation.152 
An interesting by-product of this unprecedented government effort to 
shore up the ability of banks and their holding companies to borrow and 
raise capital is the exploding popularity of bank holding companies.  The 
FRB approved the applications of Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Ameri-
can Express, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), among 
others, to become bank holding companies, notwithstanding the Bank Hold-
ing Company Act’s (BHCA) limitations on mixing banking and commerce.  
Until this financial crisis, all of these institutions assiduously avoided cha-
racterization as a bank holding company because of the limitations that 
designation places on nonbanking and nonfinancial activities of the holding 
company and because of the desire to avoid the additional regulation and 
oversight imposed by the FRB under the BHCA.  The capital infusions 
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through CPP,153 increased deposit insurance and government guarantees, 
and the public perception that institutions subject to FRB oversight are safer 
and sounder than less regulated entities, however, have made the bank hold-
ing company status quite popular.  It remains to be seen what long-term 
implications these holding companies will present for the continued separa-
tion of banking from other commercial enterprises, and whether these firms 
will gain an unfair advantage over their competitors who have not elected 
or cannot qualify for bank holding company status.     
V. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
While prior government investment in bank stock during the Great 
Depression and in 1984 in the case of Continental Illinois suggest that the 
fears of critics of government ownership may be overstated and that the 
government may ultimately be successful in retuning banks fully to private 
investors, the discussion does raise a number of concerns and pose many 
serious questions, whose answers we will have to wait and learn.  The Trea-
sury is likely the largest single equity holder of many of the institutions that 
have qualified for and accepted CPP funds.  Does this ownership stake af-
fect the government’s decisions about whether to let these institutions fail?  
Notwithstanding its extensive interest, can the government effectively pro-
tect its investment with nonvoting preferred stock?  To what extent will 
institutions exchange their CPP preferred stock for the CAP convertible 
preferred stock?  Will institutions that convert do so at the risk of chilling 
private capital investors who fear potential dilution if the CAP stock is ul-
timately converted to common stock?  Will substantial restrictions on ex-
ecutive compensation influence banking institutions to redeem their gov-
ernment ownership as soon as possible?  How long will it take institutions 
to increase capital enough to pay back the government investment?   To 
what extent will institutions with significant government investment be 
subject to political pressure regarding credit and investment decisions?  
What additional conditions is the government likely to impose on the insti-
tutions that have accepted CPP and CAP investments?  Will financial insti-
tutions be able to pay the preferred stock dividends to the Treasury and the 
increased deposit insurance assessments to the FDIC, without failing or 
compromising the safety and soundness of the institution?  Will those insti-
tutions identified as “systemically significant,” a thinly veiled code-name 
for an institution that is “too big to fail,” including Citigroup and Bank of 
America, be subjected to market discipline or benefit from further govern-
ment support?  The Financial Stability Plan and its forward looking assess-
ment for the nineteen largest bank holding companies, whose assets exceed 
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equity in bank subsidiaries, see Broome, supra note 125, at 23; Broome, supra note 137, at 26. 
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$500 billion, indicate that these institutions, holding two-thirds of all bank 
holding company assets, are the ones about whose survival the government 
is most concerned.    
Since October 3, 2008, the government has made extraordinary inter-
ventions to bolster bank balance sheets and avoid bank failures.  Whether 
these efforts are successful in avoiding widespread bank failure, it is clear 
that they have dramatically changed the relationship between banks and the 
government for the foreseeable future.  Whether this relationship will be 
reduced over time, as occurred with the RFC preferred stock and the gov-
ernment’s investment in Continental Illinois, where the government invest-
ments were fully recouped, remains to be seen. 
 
